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Faculty and Deans

The Search for
Global Standards
Idle words or constructive
dialogue? Jayne Barnard

businesses may need to submit themselves to 'broader
collective objectives' than mere profit.

comments on the OECD's
Corporate Governance Project

Enforcing Standards
This kind of accommodation is necessary when the
member nations' experiences with corporate governance are so diverse. In the US, for example, the experi-

0

n 2 April 1998, the Organisation for Economic

ence includes a highly regarded government regulator,

Co-operation and Development (OECD) re-

the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It also

ceived a report from its Business Sector Advisory

includes: a clear legal bias in favour of shareholders'

Group recommending that it commence drafting a set

interests; widespread use of shareholders' derivative

of global guidelines on the subject of corporate gover-

suits; exacting standards for financial disclosure; out-

nance. The report — Corporate Governance: Improving

spoken — and organised — institutional investors; share-

Competitiveness and Access to Capital in Global Markets
— was prepared by a team of distinguished executives

holder suffrage on a one-share, one-vote basis; simplified
proxy voting, available to all; access to the ballot under

headed by US lawyer Ira Millstein. The executives

the SEC's 'shareholder proposal' rule; boards of direc-

represented the management elite of Britain, France,

tors comprised largely of independent outsiders; a tra-

Germany, the US and Japan.

dition of board committees with responsibility for audit,

Already, the Advisory Group has become known
as the six 'wise men' and already their report has been
dismissed as `pointless' and, as an article in The Daily

nomination, compensation, and compliance with the
law; and a vigorous, probing business press.
In Japan, France and Germany, by contrast, the

Telegraph puts it, indicative of the OECD's 'endless

national experience with corporate governance has been

quest for things to do'. In fact, the Advisory Group

quite different. 'Other constituencies' receive far more

report contains some valuable insights into the 'core

deference in those countries than is customary in the

principles' of good corporate governance, and also

US; the regulatory structures are less obtrusive; account-

demonstrates some shrewd political thinking about

ing standards are less demanding (and hardly uniform

how improvements in corporate governance can be

among neighbouring countries); the behavioural expec-

achieved.
The report itself is a model of diplomacy. On the

tations of directors are less well-defined; directors are
seldom truly 'independent'; there is more 'patient capi-

one hand, it emphasises the primacy of shareholder

tal' in the sense that non-arms-length investors may be

interests over those of other constituencies. Without

willing to defer their gains, sometimes indefinitely;

shareholder protection devices and a clearly stated

and (although this may be changing) the sense of

commitment to permit businesses to seek long-term

shareholder entitlement and a need for protective

growth and profit, capital will not flow into a nation's

mechanisms is less pronounced than in the US.

economy. On the other hand, the report recognises that

The 'next tier' of OECD countries and other

`corporations must function in the larger society' and

emerging economies, however, present the greatest

sometimes shareholders' interests must give way to those

challenge to creating uniform standards of corporate

of other constituencies. At times, the report concedes,

governance. In many of these countries, corporate

governance practices can range from
limitations on the number of shares
an equity owner may own or vote;
to refusal to accept proxy votes by
mail; to physical intimidation of

the following features: it should
provide leadership in setting corporate strategy; it should provide
active oversight of management;
its members should be independ-

shareholders who appear at annual
meetings! In most of these countries,
one finds huge boards of 'neutered'

ent of management; it should have
control over the audit function
and ensure that financial accounts

directors who make no claim to independent empowerment and, in
fact, who seldom meet; vast crossshareholdings and interlocking
directorates; nepotism; cronyism; no tradition of board
committees for important matters such as nominating,
audit or compensation; compensation practices that
bear no relationship to corporate performance; complete subjugation of minority shareholders (including

are in order; it should control its
own succession; it should assume
responsibility for the company's
compliance with the law; and its
members should regularly engage in self-criticism and
evaluation.
Given these guidelines, the Advisory Group report is clearly committed to building an 'independent

having no right to notice of shareholders' meetings);
and a woeful lack of any meaningful financial disclosure.
Though the Advisory Group report suggests that
these differing experiences can be harmonised, largely
through voluntary action, of course they cannot, at least
any time soon. However, rather than despairing of the

board culture' in businesses throughout the world
and that is admirable. Though observers may differ
on who qualifies as truly 'independent', or on how
independence should be enforced, or whether independence even matters when it comes to the bottom
line — to reduce strong corporate governance to its
most essential core is to insist upon independence

difficulties inherent in trying to force convergence in
corporate governance norms, the Advisory Group report
takes the wiser rack of attempting to reduce the
principles of corporate governance to an irreducible
minimum. A few changes must be required by

at the board of directors level. True reform is not
about remedies, or specific forms of financial disclosure, or mandatory audit committees, or the voting
rights of pension funds. It is about the willingness
of corporate directors to act independently, to en-

governments; others must be made by business leaders
in response to market demands. To a large degree, by
staying at this level of abstraction, the Advisory Group
succeeds in setting out a framework, and offering an
exhortation, for the future evolution of global corporate

force ethical standards and to eliminate those
executives who refuse to honour the board's directives. The Advisory Group delivers that message
perfectly.
The second key message then becomes obvious.

governance standards.

For a corporate governance system to work effectively,
it must keep in mind the legitimate concerns of investors. 'Shareholders require reasonable assurances
that their assets will be protected against fraud, managerial or controlling shareholder self-dealing, and
other [forms of] "insider" wrongdoing,' the Advisory Group asserts. 'Policy makers ... should provide
clear, consistent and enforceable securities and capital market regulations designed to protect shareholder
rights.'
To some extent, of course, shareholders will assert
their own rights, or withhold their capital. Current
activities in Asia make clear that where money is
desperately needed, investors' demands for more protection can be accommodated by private agreement.

The Report's Strengths
First, the overall principles stressed in the Advisory
Group's report — fairness, transparency, accountability
and responsibility — are surely desirable in any corporate
governance environment, regardless of cultural or
regulatory differences. The call for common accounting
standards is essential in a global marketplace.
Perhaps the greatest contribution can be found
in the Advisory Group's treatment of boards of
directors' practices and objectives. According to the
report, every corporate board, regardless of the
country in which it operates, and regardless of the
legal structure to which it is confined, should share

The Advisory Group is wise,

investors' views should receive

however, in suggesting that national

close attention in further OECD

governments be supportive of these

actions.

efforts. It is even wiser to recognise

No one should imagine that

that there is only so much that

national legislation or traditional

legislation can accomplish and that

business practices will change

too much legislation, too inflexibly

overnight, and if they do, it will

written, can be counter-productive

have more to do with the demands

and actually hinder corporate

of capital suppliers than the sug-

governance reform.

gestions of the OECD. Neverthe-

The Advisory Group's report

less, the Advisory Group's shaping

makes three additional contribu-

of this issue, and its measured

tions, especially to the political discourse in 'adolescent'

suggestions to national policy makers, can only be

economies: (1) it states clearly that acceptable corpo-

viewed as constructive and a help in accelerating the

rate governance practices can have a powerful impact

necessary reform process.

on a nation's economy; (2) it reminds policy makers
that capital suppliers throughout the world increasingly
care about corporate governance issues; and (3) it
suggests that, sometimes, a country must endure 'shortterm social costs' in order to achieve long-term
economic success. All of these points need to be made
— whether the OECD will prove a credible source for
them (as opposed to, say, the IMF) is, of course, another matter.

The Road Ahead
It now looks as if the OECD hierarchy will take up
the call to draft global guidelines for corporate
governance practices. In doing so, the organisation
should seek to avoid one of the mistakes of the
Advisory Group: investors themselves were not
represented. One must wonder why, when at least
three organisations representing international
investors — the US Council of Institutional Investors,
the California Public Employees Retirement System
(CalPERS) and the Geneva-based International
Corporate Governance Network — have already
expressed their concerns about differing governance
standards throughout the world, and are devising
their own sets of 'best practices' guidelines to help
them in making trans-boundary investment decisions. To have excluded these voices, and the values
they have expressed, from representation on the
Advisory Group was surprising and unfortunate —
especially since the last time Ira Millstein went
through an exercise like this in the US, he included
representatives of three significant institutional
investors among his task force members. These

